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ABSTRACT 
 
Overall, this paper examines and finds the relation between the ratio of accounting treatment for capitalization of 
research and development expenditure (RCR&D). The theoretical model derived from panel analysis resource on 
Korean defense industry information from 2009 to 2014 indicates that the RCR&D positively affect earnings 
management direction through a significantly positive relationship. Also, the effect of large defense industry firms’ 
RCR&D on earnings management direction is higher than that of small ones despite that large defense industry firms 
have discretionary accruals in (-) direction compared with small ones. In addition, the effect of defense industry firms’ 
RCR&D on earnings management direction is strong especially in earnings increasing group. Also the change of 
RCR&D is positive influence on discretionary accruals. This enforces that RCR&D can be related with earnings 
management direction.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
efense industry is an industry related to National Security and Government (the Government of 
Republic of Korea) and is the key customer of the industry. The asymmetric information between 
Government and defense industry companies has significant difference in the matter of importance 
compared to other industries. For example, if a defense industry company does not perform proper internal control on 
accounting fraud or earnings management behavior occurred in the company, that company will fall under sudden 
financial difficulty which may cause difficulty in defense activity between defense industry companies and military 
authorities. It has direct connection to the vacuum of national security.  
 
In general, a system of corporation divides ownership and management, thus as the information asymmetry between 
stockholders of a corporation and management increases, it is highly likely to occur earnings management behavior 
(Kim, Bae & Choi, 2012). Moreover, during Government’s regulatory reform period, defense industry companies 
perform earnings management behavior. It is first, with intent of downward revision in profit in order to hold a lead 
in negotiation with Government. Second, it is to increase managers’ compensation within the boundary of upper and 
lower limit of management compensation contract, which increases the compensation according to the recorded profit 
within the boundary of contract (Healy, 1985). Therefore, this study seeks to find an accounting characteristic of a 
defense industry company, which in that company’s management performing earnings management behavior in order 
to achieve a specific purpose. For this purpose, this study analyses defense industry companies’ earnings management 
behavior focusing on R&D expenditure, which is typically utilized as a means of earnings management. No. 1038 
Intangible Asset of Korean International Financial Reporting Standards regulates recognition requirements for 
expenditure and asset of R&D related expenditure. R&D related expenditure basically treated as an expenditure in 
accounting and may be treated as asset in case of differentiability, controllability, economic benefit in future are 
recognizable. Nevertheless, managements utilize R&D expenditure as a means of earnings management of actually 
D 
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accrued profit by capitalizing or treating R&D expenditure as an expenditure in order to achieve a special purpose 
(Bae, Yoon & Kim, 2014). For the defense industry, this type of R&D investment is affirmatively promoted by 
Government to defense industry companies. For example, according to Art. 38 of Defense Acquisition Program Act, 
Government grants a long-term low interest loan to defense industry companies when a defense industry company 
spends R&D expenditure to localize defense articles or other military supplies. Government also implements “the 
support project of weapon system remodeling and development”, which supports 75% of total expense limited to 1 
billion won during 3 years when management of weapon system function improvement, an economic ripple effect or 
feasibility of development plan are recognized.1 When management’s arbitrariness were intervened, R&D related 
expenditure could be the means of earnings management. Thus, this study attempts an analysis whether an accounting 
treatment of R&D related expenditure has any relevance with defense industry companies’ earnings management.  
 
This study selects discretionary accruals as substitute variable applied for earnings management utilized in analyzing 
the relevance between capitalizing treatment of defense industry companies’ R&D expenditure and earnings 
management. This is because management performs earnings management behavior in consideration with accounting 
estimates or specific accounting treatment, and most of earnings management studies verify earnings management by 
the volume of discretionary accruals which reflects a net effect of accounting choice (Kwon, Kim, Son, Choi & Han, 
2010).  
 
Previous defense industry-related preceding studies has been performed mostly in analyzing systematic characteristics 
of cost on defense industry, its drawbacks and determinant of earnings management. This study, however, attaches its 
importance that it analyzes relevance between earnings management of defense industry companies and accounting 
treatment of R&D expenditure, where information asymmetry is bigger than other industries.  
 
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section II illustrates preceding studies and elicited hypothesis. Section III 
discusses research models to verify the hypothesis and the selection of sample companies for empirical testing. Section 
IV presents the result of empirical testing. Finally, Section V summarizes the result of this study and suggests the 
limitation this study had.  
 
II. PRECEDING STUDIES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF HYPOTHESIS 
 
2.1 Studies on Earnings Management of Defense Industries 
 
Defense industry related market has limited demanders like Government, allied nations and other defense industry 
companies. It also applied to suppliers because Government designates a few companies, i.e., it is an imperfectly 
competitive market. Thus, the transparency of cost information on defense industry market shows relatively lower 
than that of civilian market. Accordingly, studies regarding earnings management have been made on the premise that 
there will is an arbitral accounting treatment performed by management. Yoon, Lee, Jeong and Ahn (2007) argued 
that the defense industry market has difficulty to apply market principle, and each demander and supplier has exclusive 
position. They further argued that it makes several characteristics of the market in price determination on product or 
service and suppliers are tempted to opportunistic earnings management to maximize his/her profit.  
 
Preceding studies related defense industry companies comprise its majority on earnings management due to 
information asymmetry, which is a native problem between defense industry and Government, its major transaction 
object. Typically, Lichtenberg (1992) reported defense industry companies in U.S. records higher business profit rates 
than that of civilian companies. He argued that Government exclusively carry forward the demand and supply follows 
                                                             
1 Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), implementation of ‘the support project of weapon system remodeling and development’, 
Jan. 2, 2014, gukjenews http://www.gukjenews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=67808 DAPA announced its initiation of ‘the support project 
of weapon system remodeling and development’ in 2014 to support company’s proposed R&D for the remodeling of weapon system. Major contents 
are as follows. First, Governments considers following factors to evaluate the supporting necessity and select support targets: business management 
of a company’s R&D proposal for the remodeling of weapon system which has domestic procurement record, possibility of domestic necessity as 
well as feasibility of development plan, technical and economic ripple effect and possibility of export. Government supports interests on R&D loan 
or grants a loan on 75% of total expense limited to 1 billion won during 3 years to selected R&D according to ‘the public announcement on 
management of financing for the defense industry promotion’. DAPA announced “this ‘supporting project’ will activate companies’ voluntary 
investment, and in turn, expect to strengthen R&D capability and activate performance improvement.” 
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the exclusive market which causes information asymmetry on the quality of defense industry material, which in turn 
makes the deal price beyond optimum level.  
 
Reichelstein (1992) also stated there is a possibility that defense industry companies may utilize cost accounting 
information calculated by themselves which Government cannot verify its accuracy and thus could be a mean to secure 
the profit beyond normal return.  
 
There are several studies analyzing earnings management behavior on the companies transferring the cost which 
comprises both defense industry and civilian industry, and transferring between them. In particular, Thomas and Tung 
(1992) discovered an allowance for pension liability employees in non-defense industry has been transferred into 
employees of defense industry after analyzing first, defense industry contract’s cost reimbursement-based profit-
decision structure, second, companies’ arbitrariness in setting allowance for pension liability which produces both 
defense articles and non-defense articles.  
 
Kim, Chae and Yang (2007) stated that defense industry companies will intentionally reduce book income to induce 
the improvement of system preferable to defense industry companies before initiating the improvement of national 
defense system and reported significant result regarding the statement. Further, Yong, Jeong and Ahn (2015)2 
performed a study regarding an influence of the independence of board of directors to its earnings management with 
the number of outside directors as an alternative. The result discovered that higher the independence of board of 
directors reduced earnings management.  
 
To sum up, defense industry companies excessively appropriate its cost or transfer its cost from civilian industry 
(department within a company) utilizing information asymmetry due to its inherent transaction structure or reduces 
its book income to foster preferable condition in negotiation with Government. These various methods were all 
regarded as earnings management behaviors. According to the analysis of preceding studies, the issue of earnings 
management on defense industry companies which contains relatively higher information asymmetry compared to 
civilian companies, requires more detailed study than other industries.  
 
2.2 Preceding Studies on Accounting Treatment of R&D Expenditure 
 
Expensing or capitalization of R&D expenditure is a typical matter of accounting choice and it has been understood 
among various scholars that accounting treatment of R&D expenditure by company is an economic decision-making 
performance based on company’s discretionary choice.  
 
Especially, it is highly probably that R&D expenditure could be utilized as a means of earnings management pursuant 
to company’s interest in the process of accounting treatment for the expense already expended. Na (1999) reports that 
companies having higher level of R&D expenditure and debt ratio with low corporate tax rate prefer capitalization of 
accounting treatment. On the contrary, companies under the object of regulation prefer expensing of accounting 
treatment.  
 
Chae and Kim (2000) reported results that first, companies prefer a capitalization of R&D expenditure for smooth 
financing. Further, companies with higher tax burden ratio prefer expensing of R&D expenditure to reduce cost of 
taxation. Finally, companies choosing expensing of R&D expenditure with higher R&D expenditure lead to reduction 
of net profit and therefore prefer capitalization of accounting treatment.  
 
There were several studies regarding a relevance between unexpected earnings, the difference between expected 
earnings and actual income, and accounting treatment of R&D expenditure based on the expectation that a company 
will treat the accounting by increasing the income when actual income is lower than expected income and reduce the 
income on the other way. Choi (1997) analyzed whether companies arrange the amount of R&D investment or decide 
arbitral accounting treatment on R&D expenditure in order to achieve certain object by increasing or decreasing the 
income. The results appears that if companies’ income of pertinent year does not meet their expected income, then 
                                                             
2 Yong et al. (2015) stated higher ratio in the number of outside directors in board of directors will lead to reduce earnings management behavior 
because outside directors, unlike internal directors, monitor and control cost transferring companies which could be an abnormal behavior.  
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there were strong tendency to increase book income by reducing R&D investment and capitalizing R&D expenditure 
already expensed. On the contrary when the income of pertinent year excesses expected income, then there was a 
tendency to increase R&D investment. However, an analysis on the expectation from the reduction of book income 
by expensing R&D expenditure already expensed did not deduct significant result. Kim (1996) reported that there was 
a tendency on companies with higher unexpected income treat accounting treatment of R&D expenditure as an 
unexpected R&D expenditure (period cost).  
 
Meanwhile, studies on relevance between the evaluation of corporate value and accounting treatment of R&D 
expenditure has been under active process. Kim and Shin (2006) studied whether there is a particular difference in 
relevance on corporate value between companies capitalizing total R&D expenditure, i.e., conservative accounting 
treatment, and companies which did not. The result reported that R&D expenditure shows negative relation with 
corporate value regardless of the difference. Noh (2011) analyzed an influence on corporate value in case of expensing 
research expenditure and capitalizing regular development cost, dividing into high-tech industry and non-high-tech 
industry. The result revealed explanation power has increased consistently in both industries and the level of increase 
of explanation power in high-tech industry was higher than non-high-tech industry. The report further explained the 
reason with the statement that company spending more R&D expenditure shows deviation between its book value and 
market value and as a result tend to show low usability of accounting information. In case of high-tech industry with 
vigorous R&D and its relatively low usability of accounting information, their corporate value relatedness was 
increased by capitalization of R&D expenditure than that of non-high-tech industry.3  
 
To sum up, due to an accounting choice of E&D expenditure, an accounting treatment of R&D expenditure may be 
utilized as an adjusting means of company’s book income. Like in earnings management, there are several source of 
book income adjustment like debt covenant hypothesis, deferral of corporate tax.  
 
2.3 Setting Up Hypothesis 
 
An accounting treatment of R&D expenditure chose by management’s voluntary decision making, and it is highly 
probable this decision making will be utilized as a means of earnings management pursuant to company’s business 
situation. In particular, defense industry spends more R&D expenditure than that of civilian industry, and thus it is 
highly probable that R&D expenditure could be utilized as a means of earnings management. According to Art. 11 of 
Defense Acquisition Program Act (No. 13507), it regulates localization and R&D of weapon system in order to achieve 
independent national defense capability through the development of defense science and technology under the basic 
performance principle of improvement business on defense capacity. Article 38 specifies that Government may grant 
a long-term low interest loan to defense industry companies when a defense industry company spends R&D 
expenditure to localize defense articles or other military supplies. Defense industry companies will spend more R&D 
expenditure than civilian industry as far as Government supports sufficient funds of R&D activities. Therefore, this 
study tries to reveal an accounting treatment of R&C expenditure is utilized as a means of earnings management by 
verifying the relation between the tendency of accounting treatment on R&D expenditure in the defense industry 
which records higher information asymmetry and discretionary accruals as an alternative to earnings management. 
For this purpose, we set following hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1: in defense industry, the level of capitalizing accounting treatment of R&D expenditure has positive 
relation with discretionary accruals.  
 
In addition, we will analyze the difference of relevance between capitalizing account treatment of R&D expenditure 
per corporate size and earnings management. First, we expect there will be a different level of asymmetry per corporate 
size. Generally, Government applies stricter regulation and monitoring on conglomerates than small and medium-
sized entities (SMEs). Thus, conglomerates will show lower level of earnings management than SMEs, and so does 
on the level of earnings management through accounting treatment of R&D expenditure. Accordingly, we set 
following hypothesis. 
 
                                                             
3 R&D expenditure reduces utility of accounting information, but capitalizing R&D expenditure formerly treated expense rises value relevance and 
eventually increases utility of accounting information (Lev & Zarowin, 1999: Chambers et al, 2003) 
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Hypothesis 2-1: a larger defense industry company has lower discretionary accruals.  
 
Hypothesis 2-2: in defense industry, the influence of conglomerates’ level of capitalizing accounting treatment on 
R&D expenditure will be less than that of SMEs.  
 
However, we may consider “Hypothesis 2-2” in opposite. Park and Yang. (2011) shows there are a difference of level 
of R&D expenditure intensity between conglomerates and SMEs. SMEs records higher than conglomerates and SMEs 
has more burden on outside monitoring on single R&D expenditure item. Thus, conglomerates may have lower 
discretionary accruals but higher relevance between a ratio of capitalizing accounting treatment on R&D expenditure 
and earnings management. Therefore, we set following hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 3: in defense industry, the influence of level of capitalizing accounting treatment on R&D expenditure to 
discretionary accruals that affects conglomerates is higher than that of SMEs.  
 
III. A STUDY DESIGN AND SAMPLE SET UP 
 
3.1 An Estimation of Discretionary Accruals 
 
This study estimated discretionary accruals according to modified-Jones model (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeny, 1995). 
Specifically, we estimate discretionary accruals by formula (1) and (2), and in turn, analyze the influence of accounting 
treatment of R&D expenditure on discretionary accruals. 
 
Formula (1)  
 𝑇𝐴#$𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡#$() = 𝑎, + ( 1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡#$()) + 𝛽)(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉.#$ − ∆𝐴𝑅.#$𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡#$() ) + 𝛽8( 𝑃𝑃𝐸.#$𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡#$()) + 𝜉$ 
 
Formula (2)  
 𝐷𝐴 = 𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡#$() − <𝑎,( 1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡#$()) + 𝛽)(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉.#$ − ∆𝐴𝑅.#$𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡#$() ) + 𝛽8( 𝑃𝑃𝐸.#$𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡#$())=	 
 
 𝑇𝐴#$ Corporate j’s total accruals in year t(net income – cash from operations) ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉#$  Corporate j’s difference in sales (current sales – previous sales) ∆𝐴𝑅#$ Corporate j’s difference in account receivables in year t (current account receivables – 
previous account receivables) 𝑃𝑃𝐸#$ Corporate j’ tangible assets in year t 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡#$() Corporate j’s total assets in year t-1 
 
 
3.2 Empirical Analysis Model 
 
In this study, an R&D expenditure treated (in accounting) as a capitalization is an increased development expenditure 
of the financial statement of the year. An R&D expenditure treated as an expensing is a sum of regular development 
expense, research expense and ordinary research and development expense in all-inclusive income statements. 
 
This study premises management intervenes with its discretionary decision making in deciding accounting treatment 
of R&D expenditure. The ratio of capitalized among total accrued R&D expenditure (Arnd), formula (3), is as follows. 
 
Formula (3)  
 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛 = 𝑅𝐷exp𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡))𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑅𝐷exp𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒8)  
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1) R&D expenditure treated as an asset:  Statement of financial position year end R&D 
expenditure – basic development expenditure + 
Depreciated amount of development expenditure at the 
term 
2) Total accrued R&D expenditure:  R&D expenditure treated as an asset +R&D expenditure 
treated as an expenditure 
*R&D expenditure treated as an expenditure  = Research expenditure in all-inclusive income 
statements + regular development expenditure, regular 
R&D expenditure 
 
 
A model to verify this study’s hypotheses are as follows in formula (4). 
 
Formula (4)  
 𝐷𝐴.#$ = 𝑎, + 𝛽)𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑.#$ + 𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔.#$ + 𝛽M𝐵𝑖𝑔.#$ × 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑.#$ + 𝛽O𝑅𝑂𝐴.#$ + 𝛽Q𝑇𝐴#$() + 𝛽R𝐿𝐸𝑉#$+ 𝛽# T𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚# + 𝛽# T𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟X + 𝜉#$  
 
 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ : Corporate j’s ratio of capitalized R&D expenditure in year t 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$ : Dummy variables, 1 for conglomerate, 0 for not conglomerate 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$ × 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ : Moderating variable 𝑅𝑂𝐴#$ : Corporate j’s return on total assets in year t 𝑇𝐴#$() : Corporate j’s total accruals in year t-1 𝐿𝐸𝑉#$  : Corporate j’s debt ratio in year t T𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚# : Corporate dummy T𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟# : Year dummy 
 
 
The model’s dependent variable is discretionary accruals of an entire company. As explained earlier in Formula (3), 
this study set the ratio of capitalized R&D expenditure in the year as an explanatory variable to prove Hypothesis 1 
that confirming whether the level of capitalizing R&D expenditure is a signal of discretionary accruals. An explanatory 
variable to verify Hypothesis 2-1 that confirming the difference in earnings management between conglomerates and 
SMEs, this study set “1” for conglomerates and “0” for not conglomerates. Also, a moderating variable was set to 
multiply the ratio of capitalized R&D expenditure and a dummy variable to confirm Hypothesis 2-2 that whether being 
a conglomerate has a regulation effect in signing discretionary accruals of R&D expenditure.  
 
This study also set return on total assets, total accruals in the former half (of the year) and debt ratio a control variables. 
We included return on total assets to control management performance pursuant to a corporate size. Total accruals in 
the former half (of the year) was included based on the study of Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, and Subranmanyam. 
(1998) that it affects discretionary accruals of the term and has negative correlation. Further, debt ratio was included 
relying on the study of DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) that higher debt ratio causes elevating probability to violate a 
debt covenant.  
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3.3 Sample Selection  
 
The current status of defense industry companies in this study, we utilized current status of members4 provided by 
Korea Defense Institute Association website. Moreover, we collected companies’ financial materials utilizing 
KISVALUE (ver. 3.2) of Korea Investors Service Inc. between 2009 and 2014. Among entire 476 observed values, 
we excluded missing values, values less than 0 and cash from operation is missing values. Therefore, we finally chose 
and utilized 464 observed values.5 
 
IV. RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL TESTING 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 1 indicates descriptive statistics of 464 samples of study objects between 2009 and 2014. An average value of 
DA records -0.001, a negative value. However, the standard deviation recorded 0.111 which we may estimate that it 
shows comparatively equal distribution both in positive and negative numbers. We found that 𝑇𝐴#$()	mainly generated 
negative total accruals, as an average of -0.028 and the median of -0.020. 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$	shows an average of 0.504 and the 
standard deviation is bigger than the average.  𝐵𝑖𝑔#$ has an average of 0.288, which shows the weight of conglomerates 
in entire defense industry is lower than that of SMEs, and thus Korean defense industry is comprised of SMEs mainly.  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Average Median Standard deviation Minimum value Maximum value 𝐷𝐴#$ -0.001 0.003 0.111 -0.588 0.797 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ 0.504 0.580 0.595 -3.273 3.543 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$ 0.288 0.000 0.453 0.000 1.000 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$ + 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ 0.110 0.000 0.288 -0.904 1.405 𝑅𝑂𝐴#$ 0.026 0.030 0.094 -0.768 0.401 𝑇𝐴#$() -0.028 -0.021 0.115 -1.043 0.283 𝐿𝐸𝑉#$ 0.620 0.623 0.262 0.093 2.219 
 
 
Table 2 shows a correlation of variables utilized in hypotheses. 𝐷𝐴#$ has significant correlation with 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ which 
records 0.089, it shows higher capitalization of R&D expenditure leads to increase discretionary accruals. 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ has 
correlation with 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$, which records -0.184. it shows significant correlation and conglomerates has lower level of 
capitalization of R&D expenditure compared to SMEs, it is also expected that an influence to discretionary accruals 
will be less than that of SMEs. 𝑅𝑂𝐴#$, a control variable, has positive effect, and negative effect with 𝐿𝐸𝑉#$ . 
 
  
                                                             
4 According to Art. 35 of Defense Acquisition Program Act, total 95 domestic companies are designated as a defense industry company companies 
which are10 thermal powers (Hanwha Defense Systems, etc.), 9 ammunitions (Poongsan, etc.), 14 mobility (Doosan Heavy Industries & 
Construction, etc.), 16 aircraft guidance (Korea Aerospace Industries, etc.), 19 communication electronics (Hanwha Systems, etc.), 3 CBR 
(chemical, biological, and radiological, Sancheong, etc), 13 others (Dongin optical science, etc).  
5 In modified-Jones model (1995), it calculates total accruals by deducting cash flow of operation from sales in the term. This study excluded it 
because if the cash flow of operation is missing, total accruals are excessively calculated and eventually affects an estimation of coefficient for 
discretionary accruals.  
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Table 2. Pearson Correlation Coefficient of Variables on Hypothesis 
Division 𝑫𝑨𝒊𝒕 𝑨𝒓𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕 𝑩𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒕 𝑩𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒕+ 𝑨𝒓𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕 𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕(𝟏 𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕 𝐷𝐴#$ 1.000       𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ 0.089 1.000      0.099 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$ 0.044 -0.184 1.000     0.361 0.001 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$ + 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ 0.070 0.229 0.559 1.000    0.191 <.0001 <.0001 𝑅𝑂𝐴#$ 0.509 0.087 0.013 0.045 1.000   <.0001 0.102 0.781 0.403 𝑇𝐴#$() -0.059 0.044 0.050 0.102 -0.024 1.000  0.215 0.413 0.287 0.055 0.605 𝐿𝐸𝑉#$ -0.022 -0.014 0.001 -0.015 -0.193 -0.142 1.000 0.640 0.789 0.989 0.773 <.0001 0.002 
 
 
4.2 The Result of Empirical Analysis 
 
The Table 3 is the result of empirical analysis. We divided entire samples into one party that records increased net 
income year-on-year and another that decreased. Then, we analyzed the influence of each party’s accounting treatment 
of R&D expenditure on earnings management. This process was to figure out whether the accounting treatment of 
R&D expenditure was a means to manipulate increase or decrease of net income. In each model, explanatory variables 
are the ratio of capitalized R&D expenditure, whether conglomerate or not and conglomerate’s adjustment effect of 
capitalization.6 Panel A is the result analysis on entire 464 samples. A regression coefficient of 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$, the ratio of 
capitalization on discretionary accruals, is 0.0260 and t stat records 2.03 which shows explanation power at 5% level. 
It implies that higher capitalization rate of R&D expenditure leads to higher adjustment of profit and it supports 
Hypothesis 1. We parameterized based on the ratio of capitalizing R&D expenditure, we may inversely interpret in 
case when R&D expenditure was expensed. i.e., if R&D expenditure was expensed, then it influences on decrease of 
book income with the same level of explanation power.  
 
Next, a regression coefficient of 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$, the dummy variable indicating whether it is a conglomerate, is -0.1011 and t 
stat records -1.95 which shows explanation power at 10% level. i.e., conglomerate has lower level of upward 
adjustment in its income than that of SMEs, and it supports Hypothesis 2-1. Further, a regression coefficient of 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$ +𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$  to confirm whether conglomerate’s level of capitalizing R&D expenditure adjusts earnings management 
upwardly, is 0.0774 and t stat records 2.10 which shows explanation power at 5% level. Thus, conglomerate shows 
higher ratio of capitalizing R&D expenditure leads to more upward adjustment of earnings management than SMEs. 
Moreover, 𝑇𝐴#$() as a control variable on discretionary accruals of defense industry companies during the period is 
each 0.8207 and -0.1824 which shows explanation power at 1% level. It matches with the study of Becker et al. (1998). 
Shows identical with the study of DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) which both appear negative value but it was not a 
significant result statistically.   
 
  
                                                             
6 As an effect of verification through moderating variables, we analyze the different influence of capitalization on earnings management between 
conglomerates and SMEs.  
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Table 3. Regression of Hypothesis (on entire samples) 
Panel A. 464 𝐷𝐴.#$ = 𝑎, + 𝛽)𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑.#$ + 𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔.#$ + 𝛽M𝐵𝑖𝑔.#$ × 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑.#$ + 𝛽O𝑅𝑂𝐴.#$ + 𝛽Q𝑇𝐴#$() + 𝛽R𝐿𝐸𝑉#$ + 𝛽#T𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚# + 𝛽#T𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟X + 𝜉#$ 
Variable Dependent Variable: Predicted sign Estimate t-value 
Intercept ? 0.0137 0.33 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ + 0.0260** 2.03 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$ - -0.1010 -1.95 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$ + 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ ? 0.0774** 2.10 𝑅𝑂𝐴#$ + 0.8207*** 12.63 𝑇𝐴#$() - -0.1824*** -3.92 𝐿𝐸𝑉#$ - -0.0274 -0.82 
Firm Fixed/Time Fixed Included 
Adjusted- 0.4370 
 
 
Table 4 shows the result of influence of capitalizing R&D expenditure on earnings management among groups which 
has fluctuated its net income year-on-year.  
 
Panel B where their net income has increased year-on-year, an regression coefficient of 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ , a ratio of 
capitalization on discretionary accruals, is 0.04227 and t stat records 1.87, which shows still significant explanatory 
power at 10% level. On the contrary, a regression coefficient of 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$  in panel C does not have significant 
explanatory power. We may analyze this result that a company recorded low net income in previous year has strong 
tendency to improve its net income compared to company recorded higher net income in previous year and thus adjust 
its book income upwardly by capitalizing R&D expenditure.  
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Table 4. Regression of Hypothesis (groups net income fluctuated) 
Panel B. (groups increased its net income year-on-year): 196 𝐷𝐴.#$ = 𝑎, + 𝛽)𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑.#$ + 𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔.#$ + 𝛽M𝐵𝑖𝑔.#$ × 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑.#$ + 𝛽O𝑅𝑂𝐴.#$ + 𝛽Q𝑇𝐴#$() + 𝛽R𝐿𝐸𝑉#$ + 𝛽#T𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚# + 𝛽#T𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟X + 𝜉#$ 
Variable Dependent Variable: Predicted sign Estimate t-value 
Intercept ? 0.0310 0.53 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ + 0.0423** 1.87 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$ - -0.0257 -0.30 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$ + 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ ? 0.0286 0.58 𝑅𝑂𝐴#$ + 1.2069*** 5.19 𝑇𝐴#$() - -0.1919*** -2.61 𝐿𝐸𝑉#$ - -0.1124*** -2.27 
Firm Fixed / Time Fixed Included 
Adjusted- 0.4606 
 
Panel C. (groups decreased its net income year-on-year): 268 𝐷𝐴.#$ = 𝑎, + 𝛽)𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑.#$ + 𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔.#$ + 𝛽M𝐵𝑖𝑔.#$ × 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑.#$ + 𝛽O𝑅𝑂𝐴.#$ + 𝛽Q𝑇𝐴#$() + 𝛽R𝐿𝐸𝑉#$ + 𝛽#T𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚# + 𝛽#T𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟X + 𝜉#$ 
Variable Dependent Variable: Predicted sign Estimate t-value 
Intercept ? 0.0229 0.37 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ + 0.0263 1.47 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$ - -0.1089 -1.54 𝐵𝑖𝑔#$ + 𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ ? 0.0981 1.28 𝑅𝑂𝐴#$ + 0.8288 9.24 𝑇𝐴#$() - -0.1457 -1.75 𝐿𝐸𝑉#$ - -0.0610 -0.92 
Firm Fixed / Time Fixed Included 
Adjusted- 0.4512 
 
 
4.3 Additional Analysis 
 
Additionally, we verified whether we could observe earnings management pursuant to a ratio fluctuation of 
capitalizing R&D expenditure year-on-year. On the basis of Formula (4) and analysis of Table 5, if a ratio has 
increased, we may estimate upward adjustment of profit. A primary purpose of additional analysis is to confirm the 
intent of earnings management including a ratio fluctuation of capitalizing R&D expenditure. Thus, we set a level 
variable of discretionary accruals as a dependent variable and a ratio of capitalizing R&D expenditure, a primary 
explanatory variable, as a varying variable. ∆𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ is the difference of capitalizing ratio between t and t-1, and it is 
a continuous variable. If a company with increased capitalizing R&D expenditure ratio year-on-year also records 
increased discretionary accruals, it will bolster previous analysis results.  
 
A regression coefficient of ∆𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ affecting discretionary accruals is 2.63, which shows positive and significant 
explanatory power at 1% level. This result implies that a company which records increased ratio of capitalizing R&D 
expenditure has high probability to report its profit upward in the term. Control variables are similar with previous 
analyses.  
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Table 5. Regression analysis based on variation of capitalization ratio 𝐷𝐴#$ = 𝑎, + 𝛽) + ∆𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽M𝑇𝐴#$() + 𝛽O𝐿𝐸𝑉#$ + 𝛽#T𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚# + 𝛽XT𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟X + 𝜉#$ 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: 
Predicted sign Estimate t-value 
Intercept ? -0.0735 -1.50 ∆𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑑#$ + 0.0249*** 2.63 𝑅𝑂𝐴#$ + 0.9058 13.55 𝑇𝐴#$() - -0.1317 -2.69 𝐿𝐸𝑉#$ + -0.0234 -0.65 
Firm Fixed/Time Fixed Included 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 A Study on Defense Industry’s Earnings Management 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyze whether a capitalization of R&D expenditure has relevance with earnings 
management in defense industry. In addition, we divided two groups into one that increased net income and another 
records decreased. Then, we proceeded whether a capitalization of R&D expenditure influences on earnings 
management. Further, we analyzed an increased ratio of capitalizing R&D expenditure year-on-year influences on 
upward adjustment of profit.  
 
The analysis period of this study was between 2009 and 2014 which we were able to collect data based on a business 
analysis data of defense industry companies, then we measured a capitalization ratio (Arndit) among 464 samples. We 
utilized a discretionary analysis (DAit) estimated by modified-Jones model (1995) as a proxy measure of earnings 
management. Major results are as follows.  
 
First, relatively higher ratio of capitalizing R&D expenditure recorded higher significant relation with discretionary 
accruals. Second, a capitalizing ratio of R&D expenditure had positive effect to discretionary accruals. Third, when 
net income has increased year-on-year, a capitalizing ratio of R&D expenditure had significant and positive effect to 
discretionary accruals. Fourth, when a capitalizing ratio of R&D expenditure has increased year-on-year, the level of 
earnings management has increased as well.  
 
This study has its meaning, from earnings management point, to practically analyze and approach an accounting 
treatment of execution of R&D expenditure in which Government aggressively support to localize its materials. 
Further, according to Art. 28 of enforcement regulation, No. 666 of Ministry of National Defense decree regarding 
cost accounting of defense articles, regulates a defense industry company, a counterparty of the contract, to submit 
evidential materials for the calculation of cost so to verify a feasibility of the cost. However, it is difficult for 
Government to scrutinize earnings management of defense industry companies where information asymmetry is high. 
At this point, analyses of this study regarding earnings management pursuant to conglomerates and SMEs, increase 
and decrease of net income and capitalizing ratio of R&D expenditure will be a good guideline on earnings 
management of defense industry companies.  
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